Strategic Planning at the Lowest Point on Earth

The lowest point on Earth is the Dead Sea. Situated 413 metres below sea level, this salt lake lies between the West Bank and Jordan. With one of the world’s first health resorts, the Dead Sea area has enjoyed important religious significance within Judaism, Islamic and Christianity histories. This unique site was a very appropriate location for a BRIDGE course in strategic planning for Jordanian election managers.

From the 6th to 9th October, election practitioners from the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior engaged in strategic planning at the Marriot’s Jordan Valley Hotel Dead Sea Resort and Spa. Two 2-day sessions were run with 22 participants in each session. The event was organized by IFES and comes after a number of other BRIDGE activities that have been run in the country. Heads of electoral districts came from across the country to attend the strategic planning training.

The participants are responsible for the management of elections in their electoral districts and do this on a part-time or temporary basis, balancing this work with their other responsibilities for the Ministry of the Interior. Coming from 42 electoral districts (excluding the 3 Bedouin districts) across 11 governorates, the participants are the highest ranking election practitioners outside of head office.

The BRIDGE course depended heavily on the strategic planning for EMBs document that was compiled by Joe Baxter from IFES several years ago. This document was translated into Arabic for this course. Participants were also provided with the IDEA Handbook on Election Management Body Design, also in Arabic. The course was run by myself and Hermann Thiel, assisted by Sara Al-Utaibi (IFES) and Sa’ad Al Shehab (Ministry of Interior). During the workshop, Sa’ad Al Shehab received his full accreditation as a BRIDGE facilitator and becomes the first representative from the Ministry to achieve the status. This step is an important step in the growth of BRIDGE in Jordan, increasing the prospect of future independent offerings of BRIDGE within the Ministry.

Participants received the training enthusiastically as this marks the first such a focus on broader strategic planning regarding elections within the Ministry. Some of the participants will go on to become governors within the different areas and this investment in their understanding of elections and planning will reap benefits in future. This session, focusing on key concepts and tools for strategic planning, is hoped to form the basis for a future follow-up which will review the 2007 elections and craft a proper strategic plan for the 2011 elections.

Running a BRIDGE course

So you want to run a BRIDGE course? BRIDGE has grown into the de facto elections training curriculum around the world today. Short for Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections, the course has developed out of initiatives by the Australian Electoral Commission, International IDEA and the UN's Electoral Assistance Division. A testimony to its growth is the addition in recent years of IFES and UNDP as partners in the BRIDGE Project.

With capacity development in elections becoming a major focus in many countries, BRIDGE represents a short-cut (not replacement) to the many years of on-the-job learning many of us were exposed to when we started in elections. However, many who see it as a simple "entry-level" training miss the point completely. Whilst it can serve that purpose, it also can act as a wake-up learning programme for those officials that have clocked up 10 to 20 years of experience behind them in the elections field. Many of these veterans have not been exposed to elections outside of their own contexts and have become complacent in what they know and tied to the belief that theirs is the best way of tackling their specialist areas.

So... Is BRIDGE the panacea for all election training ills? Well, with 23 modules covering the whole range of elections practices within the election cycle, it most certainly comes across as just what the doctor ordered. The 23 modules are structured around foundation modules, electoral architecture, stakeholders and operations. With massive flexibility coming through customisation options, one seems to be able to craft almost any training on elections around it. But, this flexibility and myriad of modules also becomes BRIDGE's greatest weakness. While in theory any accredited facilitator can appear to tackle the training, the reality and practice are quite the opposite.

A few key things spring to mind when considering selecting a credible facilitator:

• elections expertise (Has the person worked in the area? In what capacity?)
  
• facilitation competence (What experience as a facilitator does the person have?)
  
• inter-personal skills (Is there a personality "fit" between the person and yourself?)
• past experience/s in doing similar things (not necessarily BRIDGE, but also other training courses)
• knowledge of the materials (navigating through >5000 pages of material is no joke?)

Finding a good facilitator is not as difficult as one would think. Either contact the author or the BRIDGE office in Melbourne to be pointed in the right direction. A good facilitator can help you through the rest of the process. But what can you do independently?

Define "Why" Clearly?
Understand that training is about change, whether it is about improving service delivery, introducing new technology changes or simply preparing people to do their jobs. You have identified a need for training/learning and it must be driven by understanding of why. Be clear about what the change is that you wish to see. Maybe it is about addressing past problems or pushed by a need for reform or wanting to introduce a new culture of learning? Be clear about why you want the training.

Understand the Target Group
You need to understand your audience. Understanding who the audience is will guide you into your project proposal. Who are you doing the training for? What is their level of seniority? How many of them are there? What level of experience in elections do they have? What have their previous training experiences been? How does this audience fit into the broader scheme of capacity development or change that your are wanting to introduce? How long do you have for the training?

Maybe you need to separate the "audience" in two or more categories. Mixing executive management with operational or field staff might not work well. Each audience category has specific needs. Field staff need to know the detail of specific election procedures and the basic rationale behind the procedures. Executive management's focus may be more on the principles of elections and working with stakeholders. These needs can often be broken down into personal motivations, institutional/group areas and operational components. Once you can pin-point these needs, a more sophisticated picture can be developed on how training can be rolled out. Remember, people are not robots that follow recipes well. Problems in the field will quickly show up weaknesses in training that focuses simply on "robotic training".

Then what?
BRIDGE consists of 23 modules. What are the topic areas that are relevant to you? What problem areas are you trying to address? The module titled Introduction to Election Administration covers aspects of almost all the other modules. This is often a good place to start if you are not sure which modules to focus on. This module can then serve as the basis for other additions, such as greater focus on registration, contestants (political parties and candidates) or media. These components can then be added.

How long does it all take?
A typical one-week long course takes can take up to two years to put together! Rubbish is what I hear you say :-) That is if you don't have buy-in from key role-players. Have you got the funding to go ahead with the project? Have the key decision-makers inside the relevant institutions given the "green light" for the project? Does the timing of the project clash with operational time-lines? If you underestimate the amount of motivation and education that you need to put into the initial phases to get approval, then two years suddenly doesn't sound unrealistic.

However, once you have all your ducks in a row, then the next step is finding an available good facilitator, a suitable venue and making sure all the other administrative processes kick in. You may have to be prepared to wait up to two months for someone to be available. Thinking that you can also do the course with only one facilitator is unwise. The BRIDGE course prides itself on its participatory learning and drawing on global experiences. You will need at least two good fully accredited facilitators to run a full programme that lasts one week. Look for opportunities to fully accredit existing facilitators from the country or neighbouring countries.

A good venue for up to 25 participants needs to be roughly 22m x 11m. This allows for sufficient space for the various activities associated with a BRIDGE course, including ice-breakers, energizers, role plays, etc. Of course it is possible to run the sessions in smaller venues. Just make sure there is enough space elsewhere for some aspects of the course, like a large area outside the venue. The venue, along with translation services (if required), will require booking well beforehand, sometimes up to a month or two beforehand. Venues should of a suitable standard, being used regularly for similar or other conference-type events. The location of venues should also take into consideration the proximity to the head office of the participating institution, as inevitably participants' day-jobs will interfere with the course, regardless of how hard one tries to keep the learning separate. The disruptions to the course could simply prove to undermine the course to the extent of rendering its usefulness null and void.

I have a good lead facilitator and a venue...
Once facilitator/s and the venue is in place, a pre-course preparation is mandatory and this can be at least a week long prior to the course. Facilitators will need access to preparation space, printing and bulk copying/binding facilities in the run-up to the course. With a good lead facilitator the preparatory phase will be managed properly, ensuring that all the relevant materials are in place and to the appropriate standard, that all other facilitators have been briefed and are prepared for delivery of the course. The learning amongst experienced BRIDGE lead facilitators are such that checklists exist to cover most aspects of the logistical arrangements, from the preparatory phase through to the post-course component. What ultimately then distinguishes one from the other is style, experience and professionalism.

Then its all systems go...

For more information on how to go about organising your own BRIDGE course, contact me on nackerdienr@gmail.com.

Quo Vadis Zimbabwe?

"It is not power that corrupts, but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it."

— Aung San Suu Kyi

Election readiness and violence

Sometime in 2009 South Africa will be going to the polls. It will the third general election for national assembly and provincial governments since the election of 1994. Hailed by some as the "Election of the Century", the 1994 elections in South Africa stands as a ground-breaking liberation that changed the political landscape of the country, allowing all races to vote together for the first time in the countries history. Strange how the landscape has changed?

Reports of recent xenophobic attacks across the nation has shocked many of us and has been a reality check for the pace of transformation in this country. Taking place in mainly poorer communities, the xenophobic attacks seem to echo with images from the late 1980s when social unrest reached its peaks in South Africa in the fight against apartheid. Except this time, South Africans are not fighting each other, they are turning on their African brothers and sisters, as well as any foreign shop-keepers and entrepreneurs that service these poorer communities.

This discontent seemed also to echo further with other sources of emerging protests. An emerging struggle against poor service delivery and the widening income gap is spurring greater tensions amongst communities. John Pilger has called this the fight against "economic apartheid". Violent protest action also came a surprise during the last local government elections in 2006, with areas like Khutsong requiring emergency action by the South African IEC to ensure election take place as required.

The recent xenophobia, already high levels of crime, coupled with brewing tensions from the last elections around service delivery, and the leadership tussle within the dominant party creates a difficult context within which the 2009 elections will take place. Social discontent coupled with potential political manipulation saw the elections process in Kenya disrupt into an orgy of violence. Zimbabweans are currently living under a cloud of violence following the loss of ZANU PF in the March elections.

Elections have the ability to focus the spotlight on a country's pain, as well as offer a moment of social enlightenment. Elections in South Africa offered the latter in 1994. What will the 2009 elections offer? The Electoral Commission of Kenya and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission point towards the important roles such institutions played in the lifespan of a country. Will the South African IEC be up to the task for the 2009 elections? With a significant staff recruitment process currently underway, key vacancies still existing, implementation of new operational technology being rolled out in the permanent offices, as well as new technologies being developed for use during registration, the institution appears to be focussed more inward than outward. Without a balanced view, both inward and outward looking, the institution and the elections could fall foul of the increasingly fluid social tensions that are emerging. The Electoral Commission of Kenya stands as an example of failure to adequately address the external context which showed sufficiently early signs of tension.

To recount or not to recount

The Zimbabwean elections are throwing up some interesting questions about recounts during elections and bigger questions about the involvement of NGOs. At what point does a recount get done? What drives them? Is it administrative "ethics" or legalities? If an election management body fails to release results, what impact do quick counts have?

On administrative ethics , there is no obligation to have a recount except to ensure that a close race is settled properly and reduce possible legal disputes. And who authorises such a recount? Is it the presiding officer who takes the decision when there is a tie or the count is within a few votes of each other? Or must it get sanctioned at the highest executive level? I'm not talking about the reconciliation process where typically one would want to encourage clarity about the numbers going into the count. I'm talking about when the votes have been assigned to each party or candidate after reconciliation. Do party agents in the polling station have to demand a recount before one is done locally? How many times have you seen the party agents sign off on close counts only to realise later that they could have won the race based on the small differences between polling stations or constituencies and suddenly an objection is lodged!

What legal provisions exist in the electoral laws or code that spell out the circumstances surrounding a recount? Is it objection-based or does the electoral management body (EMB) decide on its own accord to order a recount? This places a lot of pressure on the EMB as it is not protected by the law. As many would know, the results process is the most sensitive part of the process, being the climax of entire elections. To operate outside of the ambit of the law at this stage could cause more problems than is necessary or warranted.

However, in all instances of ordering a recount, whether at local level or authorised from national office, one should at least have a set of results to begin with. In Zimbabwe, the National Command Centre (where results are being tallied) of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), has yet to release the provisional results since the harmonised elections were held one month ago. For a country the size of Zimbabwe, the state of its infrastructure, the number of registered voters, the provisional results should have been available within three days of the Election Day (which was 29 March 2008). In the meantime, recounts have been ordered in various constituencies based on objections raised by the ruling party. Whilst election results were posted on the doors of polling stations after the count, the tallying of those results at a centralised point is still a mystery. For now the ZEC is embarking on what it calls the verification of results.

Representatives from the regional elections network have been dispatched to try and oversee a process around the recount. Local NGOs such as the Zimbabwean Electoral Support Network (ZESN) have been called to report to the police on their operations, donor relations and the running of a quick count for a second time in two weeks. During the first time the ZESN director, Ms Rindai Chipvunde-Vava, was detained and questioned on the same issue. This time the Chairman, Mr Noel Kututwa, has also been questioned. Foreign observers have long ago left the country and the ZESN quick count most likely represents the only results data which exists outside of those known to ZEC and the ruling party. It would be of great interest to look at the provisions of the Zimbabwean electoral law that cover recounts. Whilst one can debate the legalities of these provisions or their absence, the crisis that has been emerging in Zimbabwe over the past few years can no longer be ignored. International pressure has been mounting around these elections to declare the results.

What most of us hope for though is not to see a repeat of the Kenyan violence that we started this year with. In the absence of information, rumours are aflood about the arming of militia groups following the turning away of a Chinese ship carrying arms to Zimbabwe. Our prayers are with those trying to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe.

The Conspiracy of Silence

Its been a while since my last posting as I been coming to grips with this new year and all its challenges. With the start of the new year, we have seen many resolutions come and go. Promises we have made to ourselves have come and gone. Some we have kept, others...well...let's not get into that.

Another year of experience has been added to our lives. We have seen Kenya aflame and the ashes are still warm, though the Kriegler Commission will be assured of a tough task ahead with many expectations hanging in the air. We've seen protest season open after presidential elections in Georgia (including a referendum on Nato membership) and Armenia with opposition protests and a state of emergency declared in Yerevan. After the eventful run-up to the Pakistani elections we were all relieved to see an outcome not contested by an orgy of violence. Zimbabwe prepares for its election on Saturday, 29 March, with a new political rival emerging to contest the presidential seat.

With everyone being a year richer, what has changed in the management inside EMBs? From recent discussions with colleagues it seems that nothing much has changed. Those in middle management still participate in what I call "the conspiracy of silence." I know this is a generalisation, but unfortunately I see it all too often. In an attempt not to land in trouble or ruffle too many feathers, middle managers conspire unspokenly together to cover up any bad news that may stress executive or top management. They "collude" behind the scenes to get the work done, cover up any transgressions, paper over any mistakes and generally keep the spotlight off themselves, unless it is of course serving a good cause. It is not done openly or even voiced, but silently there is an agreement on the conspiracy. In the process the work gets done and top management are none the wiser. Some may say its a cultural thing to show respect for your elders in this way. Others simply find it to be career-limiting to speak up and identify problems in public forums such as management meetings. Maybe its status-driven? Who knows?

The critical thing is that this "conspiracy of silence" serves no one. In the world of elections, speaking the truth inside an EMB is essential component for the management of crisis and other related problems. If top management don't know about a problem, then they can't deal with it. Some problems are so small that they need not attract serious attention. However, how can this be judged if it is never known about? Inasmuch as this conspiracy is agreed to amongst managers (without any clear intention to do so), it does pose a question about the organisational culture that has been created within the EMB.

How does top management react when they come to hear of a problem? Do they simply shoot the messenger? If criticism or honest problem-raising is not something condoned within the EMB, how can there be an expectation that issues will get raised properly? I've seen managers shot down in flames for raising issues that require the entire institutional attention simply because it is an unpopular opinion or the timing is perhaps not right. What kind of institutional culture is being developed in these instances? Are managers getting the message to "know their place" and continue this conspiracy.

Let's strive to get this conspiracy out in the open and have honest discussions about some of the problems we are experiencing. We will all be enriched without prolonging meetings unnecessarily. This way we can tackle real issues and deal with potential flash-points that might be looming on the horizon. Encourage people to speak up and actively show through your actions that the conspiracy is in fact against the ethic of honesty and transparency. People trust actions better than words. So, look carefully at what you do. Examples of actions to demonstrate openness in an EMB are welcomed. Offer your opinion on this matter and let's hear more views.

The impact of the Kenyan elections

The Kenyan elections and the ensuing violence dominated news headlines across the world at the start of 2008. On the cusp of the New Year, election results were announced by the Electoral Commission, which were clearly manipulated in various constituencies. The scale of the rigging leaves some major questions about the multitude of people involved in the process.

The shock of the events that flowed from the results announcement are being felt across the continent. Whilst the negotiations are underway under Kofi Annan's supervision, election management bodies must surely be asking themselves: "How can we prevent the same scenario happening here?" A seemingly credible electoral commission that was respected by its peers suddenly experiences a complete meltdown. It would be surprising to see the Commission survive the negotiation process when all talks have been concluded. The results announcement was not handled well, and nothing the Commission did after the announcement seemed to regain any inkling of credibility in the outsider's eye.

The angles being picked up by the media in various countries seems to also ask the question of what the impact of the Kenyan elections would be in a local setting. A CAFRAD-conference to be held in Morocco at the end of March tries this question of "How to Master the Electoral Process and Prevent Fraud, Disputes and Violence in African Countries". It is clear that the ripple effects of the Kenyan elections will be felt for a long time in the region and on the continent.

A case for trainer development

Much is to be said about election trainers. As the key people who engage with presiding officers or precinct commissioners, they carry the last messages from the election management body's head office to those managing the polling stations. Opportunities to engage with these officers in polling stations after the final face-to-face training session is almost insurmountable and has often been seen as a rather feeble attempt to communicate changes. Such late and brief communication has often translated into misinterpretation and incorrect action, undermining the very attempt itself. Trainers are the last vestige of communication that can be guaranteed to have greater impact. They convey the vision and values of the EMB, as well as the critical operational procedures, that are required for Election Day.

Yet often we have seen that very little goes into the development of these trainers. They are put through a short Train-the-Trainer programme that does little but give them the content of their own sessions. They are not themselves assessed in terms of their training competency or instilled with any real reminder about what they are meant to be doing to motivate presiding officers to do a better job in fulfilling the values and vision of the EMB. Too little effort is placed on these aspects of their development. Instead they are provided with a "recipe" of what they must train and when to do it. The "how" is neglected and trainers are left to their own devices when they have to do training. All that they must report on is how many have been trained and when. The quality of this training is seldom assessed.

More effort needs to go into this training of trainers. A careful balance must be struck between the timing of such efforts and the associated costs. However, the primary principle that must be addressed is providing trainers with as much preparation and support as possible. Where trainer development and procedural training go hand-in-glove clear benefits are seen. Ahead of the 2007 elections in Armenia, International IDEA organised a BRIDGE Train-the-Facilitator course which was tailored to accommodate aspects of procedural training. IFES, who managed the subsequent procedural training one month later, could identify several of the trainers as regional training coordinators and build on their BRIDGE experiences in the ensuing procedural training. The procedural training served to cement the learning process from the BRIDGE course into clear application in the field.

Subsequent observer reports commented on the improved training of polling officials and this would've definitely impacted on the quality of the election, not only in the eyes of political parties and electoral observers, but the voting populace as well. Ultimately, improving the quality and service of an election is a critical building block towards the credibility of that election and assessment of its success. Trainer development is a keystone of such a process. We need to see more development of trainers, as opposed to stand-alone "recipe"-based procedural training in elections. This most surely would result in improvements in key areas such as vote counting and results tallying, an area often given scant attention during training. It will however require the earlier identification and selection of trainers, early finalisation of legislation, procedures and materials, as well as early identification of suitable presiding officers. Definitely more investment in the heart of trainers needs to accompany the developments of their heads/minds and hands.

Restoring faith in elections

Its been seven days since the announcement of the election results in Kenya. In these seven days the world has watched with shock as violence has killed roughly 300 people in some of the worst electoral violence the continent has seen in recent years. The violence in Kenya is reminiscent of the 3-day "war" that erupted in Kinshasa when election results from the 1st round of presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo was announced mid-2006. Despite instances of electoral violence prior to the elections, indications were that Kenyans were enthusiastic about the elections and had faith in the electoral commission (ECK). In seven days all faith in the electoral process has disappeared. A timeline of the vanishing follows:

• Sunday (30 Dec): The announcement of results is disrupted prior to and during the event with power cuts and clearing of the media out of the results centre. The official announcement of results occurs later in an exclusive broadcast in a private room away from the media centre with the public television broadcaster and a few officials present. A media blackout is announced shortly after the president is sworn in.
  
• Monday (31 Dec): Violence erupts in Kenya. By the end of the Monday, four of the 22 commissioners chose to distance themselves from the announcement of the previous day, calling the election results into the question and asking for an independent enquiry.
  
  

• Tuesday (1 Jan): Election observers begin producing their preliminary reports agreeing that the voting process was credible, but all questioning the results process. Late in the day, the highly respected Chair of the ECK, Mr Samuel Kivuitu, shockingly admits to acting under pressure from rival political parties
  
• Wednesday (2 Jan): The Law Society of Kenya indicates it will challenge the result in court, berating the Chair of the ECK for his actions against a backdrop of call for mediation to bring the violence to an end.
  
• Thursday (3 Jan): Observer groups start calling for urgent action to review the results, along with international leaders
• Friday (4 Jan): Scant reference is made to the electoral commission in the online media news as the focus turns to international mediation and talks of a government of national unity
  

In six days the election commission lost all credibility that it possessed before. Even with the controversial and systematic replacement of 19 of the 22 Commissioners during the course of 2007, the renewal of Kivuitu's contract as Chair of the ECK in the weeks ahead of the election created a sense of comfort to many Kenyans and outsiders. It is now apparent that as a sole individual he was not enough to prevent the dramatic turn of events. What do Kenyans think of elections and the electoral commission today? Kenyapundit wrote that:

It is a sad day for Kenya when millions of first time young voters have had their voice ignored - how do you tell these people that their vote matters in 2012?

It is a sad day for Kenya that Kenyans will no longer trust the one avenue they have - the ballot box.

It is a sad day in Kenya that the democracy that has been painfully and slowly nurtured since 1992 has been damaged in one day.

In five years (2012) another election dawns for Kenya. What will the state of the ECK be at that time? Will the same reported high turnout of 2007 be seen in 2012? Will there be any commissioners in place that saw the 2002 AND 2007 elections? How many of senior election officials that work behind the scenes still be at the ECK? How does the ECK go about restoring faith in the electoral process? How do those civil society organisations who mobilised the masses of youth to vote respond after this election?

The post-mortem that will conducted after the dust has settled will most likely call for radical and sweeping changes to be made to the electoral law, the structure of the ECK and the powers of returning officers. Electoral reform will be the order of the day. But how do you restore faith of so many Kenyans, many of them first-time voters who queued patiently for hours on Election Day? After witnessing such devastation, as a Kenyan, how do you go and vote without recalling the trauma of the 2007 elections? The importance of the results management process has been emphasised time and again on this blog. Picking up the pieces is going to be a massive challenge for all Kenyans, not just the ECK. My sympathies go to the families and friends of those who lost loved ones in the chaos.